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Preface 
The research project on Systems Analysis of Technological and Economic Dynamics a t  IIASA is 
concerned with modeling technological and organisational change; the broader economic devel- 
opments that  are associated with technological change, both as cause and effect; the processes 
by which economic agents - first of all, business firms - acquire and develop the capabilities 
to  generate, imitate and adopt technological and organisational innovations; and the aggregate 
dynamics - a t  the levels of single industries and whole economies - engendered by the interac- 
tions among agents which are heterogeneous in their innovative abilities, behavioural rules and 
expectations. The central purpose is t o  develop stronger theory and better modeling techniques. 
However, the basic philosophy is that  such theoretical and modeling work is most fruitful when 
attention is paid t o  the known empirical details of the phenomena the work aims to  address: 
therefore, a considerable effort is put into a better understanding of the 'stylized facts7 concern- 
ing corporate organisation routines and strategy; industrial evolution and the 'demography7 of 
firms; patterns of macroeconomic growth and trade. 
From a modeling perspective, over the last decade considerable progress has been made on 
various techniques of dynamic modeling. Some of this work has employed ordinary differential 
and difference equations, and some of it stochastic equations. A number of efforts have taken 
advantage of the growing power of simulation techniques. Others have employed more traditional 
mathematics. As a result of this theoretical work, the toolkit for modeling technological and 
economic dynamics is significantly richer than it was a decade ago. 
During the same period, there have been major advances in the empirical understanding. 
There are now many more detailed technological histories available. Much more is known about 
the similarities and differences of technical advance in different fields and industries and there is 
some understanding of the key variables that lie behind those differences. A number of studies 
have provided rich information about how industry structure co-evolves with technology. In 
addition to  empirical work a t  the technology or sector level, the last decade has also seen a 
great deal of empirical research on productivity growth and measured technical advance a t  the 
level of whole economies. A considerable body of empirical research now exists on the facts that  
seem associated with different rates of productivity growth across the range of nations, with the 
dynamics of convergence and divergence in the levels and rates of growth of income, with the 
diverse national institutional arrangements in which technological change is embedded. 
As a result of this recent empirical work, the questions that  successful theory and useful 
modeling techniques ought to  address now are much more clearly defined. The theoretical work 
has often been undertaken in appreciation of certain stylized facts that  needed to  be explained. 
The list of these 'facts' is indeed very long, ranging from the microeconomic evidence concerning 
for example dynamic increasing returns in learning activities or the persistence of particular sets 
of problem-solving routines within business firms; the industry-level evidence on entry, exit and 
size-distributions - approximately log-normal - all the way to  the evidence regarding the time- 
series properties of major economic aggregates. However, the connection between the theoretical 
work and the empirical phenomena has so far not been very close. The philosophy of this project 
is that  the chances of developing powerful new theory and useful new analytical techniques can 
be greatly enhanced by performing the work in an  environment where scholars who understand 
the empirical phenomena provide questions and challenges for the theorists and their work. 
In particular, the project is meant to  pursue an 'evolutionary' interpretation of technological 
and economic dynamics modeling, first, the processes by which individual agents and organisa- 
tions learn, search, adapt; second, the economic analogues of 'natural selection' by which inter- 
active environments - often markets - winnow out a population whose members have different 
attributes and behavioural traits; and, third, the collective emergence of statistical patterns, 
regularities and higher-level structures as the aggregate outcomes of the two former processes. 
Together with a group of researchers located permanently a t  IIASA, the project coordinates 
multiple research efforts undertaken in several institutions around the world, organises workshops 
and provides a venue of scientific discussion among scholars working on evolutionary modeling, 
computer simulation and non-linear dynamical systems. 
The research focuses upon the following three major areas: 
1. Learning Processes and Organisational Competence. 
2. Technological and Industrial Dynamics 
3. Innovation, Competition and Macrodynamics 
1. Introduction 
One of the most popular themes in the applied literature on growth during the last decades 
has been the issue of convergence in GDP per capita. Numerous contributions have stressed 
the (post World War 11) tendency for GDP per capita to converge'. In its crudest form, this 
convergence reveals itself by means of significant negative correlations between initial GDP 
per capita levels and their subsequent growth rates. What seems to stand out in the debate so 
far is the particularly strong tendency for convergence during the 1950-1975 period in the 
OECD area. It is also widely known that countries outside the OECD-area have been much 
less successful in catching up to the world GDP per capita frontie?. Most developing 
(African) countries have seen the gap between themselves and the developed world increase 
significantly during the postwar period. Newly Industrializing Countries such as The Republic 
of Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong are known exceptions to the general rule that 
countries which are too far behind will not be able to catch up to the frontier. 
The particularly strong convergence over the 1950-1975 period seems to have led to 
a consensus on the hypothesis that extraordinary catching-up forces were at work during that 
period. Abramovitz (1994) gives an overview of the most likely candidates for such factors. 
This interpretation of the postwar growth pattern seems to emerge from a broader view that 
(economic) history is dominated by specific, period related phenomena, which are not to be 
generalized into more general tendencies characterizing longer periods, such as the period 
after the industrial revolution as a whole. Maddison's (1991) interpretation of the post 1850 
growth pattern as a succession of specific 'phases of growth' is an example of such an 
approach. 
While we are not unsympathetic towards the argument that 'history matters', or that 
specific historical circumstances are important for explaining observed growth patterns in the 
world, we nevertheless wish to argue that catching up and falling behind patterns can be 
interpreted in a more general setting than the one advocated by the 'historical school'. There 
are at least two interpretations of history that would support such as view. One is the idea of 
'stages of growth', as proposed for example by Rostow (1960) and Gomulka (1971). In this 
view, a country's growth pattern is predicted to go through different stages, which are linked 
in a specific order by certain factors that are believed to underlie the process of economic 
growth. Gomulka (1971) interpreted catching up as one specific stage in such a process, 
which had to be preceded by a stage of building up of (imitative) capacity. 
A second approach to history as an interconnected sequence of periods is the literature 
on long waves in economic development. Pioneered by Van Gelderen and Kondratiev, the 
idea of long waves was given an explicit theoretical basis in the theory of technological 
innovation by Schumpeter (1939). The long wave hypothesis predicts that the history of 
economic development is a sequence of upswings and downswings. The actual existence of 
long waves is a controversial topic, mainly because of numerous technical difficulties with 
regard to statistically testing the hypothesis of long-term variations in the rhythm of economic 
growth, unemployment, prices, or other economic variables. The recent application of filter 
techniques by Metz (1992) seems to provide the state-of-the-art with regard to the 
' See for example Cornwall (1977), Abramovitz (1979), Baumol (1986), Fagerberg (1988), Fagerberg, 
Verspagen and von Tunzelmann (1994). 
See for example DeLong (1988) and Verspagen (1991). 
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measurement of long waves. With regard to Schumpeter7s idea that each new long wave is 
fuelled by a sequence of major technological breakthroughs, Mensch (1979), Kleinknecht 
(1987), Freeman Clark and Soete (1982), and Silverberg and Lehnert (1993) have discussed 
the empirical evidence for such an interpretation. 
In an attempt to integrate the theories of long waves and catching up, Lundvall(1989) 
takes a somewhat intermediate position on the question of specific vs. general factors 
explaining historical growth patterns. From a Schumpeterian point of view, he argues that 
profit rate differentials are a general cause underlying the cyclical development of capitalism, 
and that profit rate differentials between countries after World War I1 were one factor causing 
a major upswing in the world economy. Thus, although Lundvall recognizes a general 
phenomenon underlying long-run development over different historical periods, he 
nevertheless points to a number of very specific factors underlying economic development 
during the postwar period. 
A similar argument, but applied to shorter 'Kuznets cycles7, is advocated by Solomou 
(1987). He finds evidence for approximately 20-year period cycles in international variables 
such as the terms of trade and international investment flows. His interpretation of this finding 
is that international capital movements react to international differences in profitability, which 
displays a wave-like pattern. When it comes to the postwar catch-up boom, however, Solomou 
(1987: 161-3) strongly supports the 'historical7 interpretation pointed to above. 
In this paper, we wish to put forward an interpretation of the long-run variations in 
catch-up patterns along the lines of these more 'general7 interpretations of economic history. 
To this end, we apply a model which is an extension of the model in Silverberg and Lehnert 
(1993). In the latter paper, it was shown that randomly distributed innovations in an 
evolutionary context can produce patterns of technical change (or economic growth) in which 
long-term fluctuations are prominent. In the next section, we will discuss the specific 
interpretation of this result, which readily extends to the model in this paper, in a long wave 
context. As a result of treatment of R&D as an endogenous engine for economic growth, the 
present model also supports a 'stages of growth7 interpretation of economic growth3. A more 
dqtailed overview of the structure and results of the present model, although in a single 
country case, is given in Silverberg and Verspagen (1994a,b). 
Thus, although in a stylized way, our model stresses both aspects of 'analyzing 
economic history in a general setting7 discussed above. In the present paper we generalize 
these interpretations from the single country context to the case of multiple economies in 
interaction with one other in a world economy. In doing so, we wish to focus on the long 
wave interpretation of the model's outcomes, and investigate to what extent these long-wave 
properties extend to the multiple country context when there is technological catching up 
between countries. 
On the basis of the model we will argue that although specific historical circumstances 
(not likely to be covered by any model) might play a large role in explaining the historical 
peculiarities of international growth, there might nevertheless be a complex interplay between 
a limited number of general factors that allow for seemingly unique features such as the 
strong convergence era during the postwar period. The model we use to analyze this 'complex 
interplay7 is admittedly simple, with many abstractions necessary to keep it tractable. Perhaps 
the most limiting assumption made is that interactions between countries are restricted to 
technological and behavioral imitation only, and that purely economic interactions such as 
See Silverberg and Verspagen (1994b) for a detailed account of this aspect of the model. 
trade, foreign direct investment and exchange rate movements are not taken into account. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the empirical stylized facts 
on long-term trends in convergence are discussed. This section also introduces the specific 
interpretation of long waves that comes out of the paper by Silverberg and Lehnert (1993), 
and that seems to be reasonably well supported by the data on long-term catching up trends. 
Section 3 sketches the structure of the model. Section 4 presents the analysis of the model, 
which is done by simulation techniques. The last section summarizes the results and draws 
some conclusions. 
2. Catching up and falling behind: the long-term stylized facts 
There is no need to recapitulate the empirical facts on catching up and falling behind in great 
detail here, as they are by now well-known and extensively documented in the references 
cited above. Therefore, we will limit the discussion to particular aspects of the empirical 
evidence that are also addressed by our model. Figure 1 presents the log of the ratio of GDP 
per capita in the United States to that of six European countries for the period 1870-1989. The 
data are taken from Maddison (1991), and are probably the longest time series available for 
this large a sample of countries4. 
Several conclusions emerge from the figure. First, it is clear that taken over the whole 
period, there is no strong trend in any of the series. Second, there are wide fluctuations in the 
ratios for each country, although there is no clear cycle of any fixed length. Third, the 
postwar period indeed seems to be a rather exceptional one, although it is also clear that a 
large part of the actual catchup after 1950 was only possible because the war itself created 
such a huge gap in the first place. At the end of the period, the gaps, as measured by this 
specific indicator, were only somewhat lower than those existing at the end of the 1930s. 
To what extent does Figure 1 support an interpretation of the history of catching up 
over the last century as a process subject to some general tendencies, as opposed to a more 
specific interpretation of the postwar period? One way of investigating this question is to use 
the data in Figure 1 for a spectral analysis, and check the results in order to see if any 
regularities arise in the power spectrum of the series5. 
Figure 2 is a double log plot of the country-ratio spectral densities against frequency 
(in units The figure demonstrates an extraordinary regularity across countries. All 
power spectra are downward sloping and approximately linear over the range 0.02-0.2, 
corresponding to cycles of period 5 to 50 years. Such a linear downward sloping power 
spectrum has been termed llfnoise (or more properly llfa noise, where -a is the slope and 
f is frequency) to indicate the power law relationship between spectral density and 
frequency6. Below a frequency of 0.02 the spectrum levels off abruptly. 
GDP is meaured in 1985 US$ using purchasing power parity conversions. Although Maddison (1991) 
provides data for nine more countries, we focus on the subset of only six (Belgium, Germany, France, United 
Kingdom, Italy and Sweden) for which the time series go back to 1870 in order to obtain the longest possible 
dataset. 
Spectral analysis is a technique which decomposes a time series into individual harmonic components and 
estimates the contribution of each to the overall motion (the spectral density or power). We employed the SPSS 
for Windows 6.0 Package with five Hamming windows in all of the following spectral plots. 
For an elementary introduction see Takayasu (1990). 
Silverberg and Lehnert (1993) have interpreted the llf-noise processes they found in 
the time series generated by their model (which is essentially a simpler version of our model) 
as a form of long waves dynamics. Although many long wave theorists have explicitly 
pointed to the possibility of long waves being combinations of cycles of different 
periodicities7, this interpretation is still rather unusual in the literature. And in contrast to the 
results from the Real Business Cycle and some of the endogenous growth literature discussed 
below, it is distinct from a random walk. 
Figure 2 suggests that this specific interpretation of long waves, or rather, low 
frequency periodic motion, is not only relevant for time series of individual countries (as in 
Silverberg and Lehnert, 1993), but also applies to variables describing relative growth 
patterns. In order to validate the results in the figure against a different measure of relative 
growth in our sample of countries, we also performed a spectral analysis of the coefficient 
of variation of GDP per capita. This variable, which is common in the debate about 
convergenceg, is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean of per capita GDP 
in the sample of countries9. 
One advantage of this measure is that it does not rely upon the definition of the 
frontier as one particular country. The choice of the USA as the frontier implies that the data 
for GDP per capita in this country is used for each of the series in Figure 1, so that one might 
argue that peculiarities in the US growth patterns caused the specific outcome of llf noise, 
and its interpretation as long waves, in Figure 2. 
Figure 3 presents the power spectrum for the coefficient of variation. It is clear that 
for this alternative definition of convergence, the presence of llfnoise also stands out. This 
leads us to the conclusion that this feature of the time series is a rather strong one, allowing 
the finding to be interpreted as a 'stylized fact' of convergence, to be added to the long list 
of such facts already identified in the literature. We must note, however, that we do not have 
sufficient data to test generalizations of this phenomenon to other sets of co~ntr ies '~.  
3. An evolutionary model 
What are the prospects of a theory trying to explain catching up and falling behind as a long 
wave phenomenon? Standard growth theory tends to explain convergence of per capita 
incomes by initial differences in the capital-labour ratio which, combined with the standard 
assumption of decreasing marginal returns to capital, leads to the conclusion that backward 
countries (with little capital relative to labour) have high growth opportunities. The immediate 
implication is global convergence, a conclusion that has been criticized from many points of 
' For example, Schumpeter (1939) extensively discussed the complex time series resulting from 
superimposing a number of cycles of different period (usually referred to as quasi-periodic behaviour in the 
dynamical systems literature). 
Dollar and Wolff (1993), for example, make frequent use of this measure. 
It is also rather common to define the coefficient of variation as the inverse of the measure used here. Our 
definition corresponds to the measure applied in Figure 1, where a downward trend indicates convergence. 
lo We did a spectral analysis on the data for 6 Latin American countries in Hofman (1993). Although the 
time series were 30 years shorter than the ones used above, the power spectrum for the coefficient of variation 
in this sample showed a clear negative slope over its range of relevant frequencies. These results are not 
documented out of space considerations, but are available from the authors on request. 
view." This critique, and the mostly linear structure of the standard growth models, makes 
mainstream growth theory an unlikely candidate for explaining the complex llfnoise pattern 
found above. 
A better candidate might be found in those new growth theories that try to combine 
growth and cycles, as for example in the 'neo-Schumpeterian7 growth literature ii la Aghion 
and Howitt (1992) and Cheng and Dinopoulos (1992, 1994). The models in these papers 
generate cyclical growth paths usually of a random walk nature. Moreover, these models rely 
upon intertemporal equilibrium, perfectly rational behaviour and rational (technological) 
expectations that do not seem convincing in the context of such complex and uncertain 
phenomena as technological change.12 We therefore choose to extend an earlier model of 
ours, which shares some concepts with the 'neo-Schumpeterian' endogenous growth literature 
(such as the stochastic representation of innovations), but tries to remedy some of the 
objections related to the above-mentioned assumptions. 
While our model dispenses with such traditional neoclassical concepts and opts instead 
for a disequilibrium, Schumpeterian approach based on bounded rationality, it nevertheless 
makes a number of drastic simplifications. For example, it neglects the role of 'social 
capabilities7 in catching up13. It assumes that technology spillovers and behavioral imitation 
are the only forms of interaction between countries, at the expense of such economic factors 
as international trade, capital and labour mobility and exchange rate movements. We therefore 
see this model as the 'Model T' of a range of evolutionary models dealing with economic 
growth and endogenous technological change in an international context. It should be 
understood as an experiment to explore the minimal set of assumptions necessary to generate 
complex dynamic phenomena such as the llfnoise found above. 
The macroeconomic heart of the model is a coupled investment and wage formation 
mechanism. Let hats above variables denote proportional growth rates, w be the (real) wage 
rate, v the employment rate (persons employed as a fraction of the labour force), and m and 
n parameters (both positive). Then the wage rate in each country14 is determined by the 
following differential equation: 
It is assumed that there is a fixed number q of firms in each of the u countries, while each 
of these firms has a variable number p, of different types of capital goods that it utilizes to 
produce a homogeneous product. New capital arises from the accumulation of profits, a 
process described by the following equation: 
" Romer (1986) and Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1990) are examples from within the neoclassical tradition 
of endogenous growth theory, while Verspagen (1991) discusses the issue in an evolutionary framework and 
Amable (1993) in a post-Keynesian one. 
l2  This critique, which is shared by most scholars in the evolutionary tradition (e.g., Dosi, 1988), has been 
discussed in more detail in earlier papers, such as Silverberg and Verspagen (1994a,b). 
'' See Abramovitz (1979, 1994) for a historical and institutional analysis of this phenomenon, and Verspagen 
(1991) for a more model-oriented approach. 
14 In order not to complicate the equations too much, we suppress subscripts indicating countries. Wherever 
we do not explicitly define variables as f m - ,  technology- or world-level, all variables are defined for countries. 
The capital stock is denoted by k, r stands for the profit rate, and o is the exogenous rate of 
physical depreciation of capital (technological obsolescence is an endogenous component of 
the model itself). The subscript i (l..q) denotes the firm, and j (l..pq) the type of capital (the 
absence of any these indices indicates an aggregation over this particular dimension). Eq. (2) 
assumes that the principal source for type ij-capital accumulation is profits generated by ij- 
capital. This is modelled by the first term on the rhs of (2), i.e., (1-yi)r,. A firm-specific 
portion of profits (denoted by y,) is used for the development of knowledge (R&D). R&D is 
restricted to cases where there are positive firm profits (i.e., when ricO, y, is set to zero). 
However, profits may also be redistributed in such a way that more profitable types 
of capital accumulate even faster, less profitable even slower, than would otherwise be the 
case. The mechanism used to model this was first proposed by Soete and Turner (1984), and 
is represented by the second term on the rhs of eq. (2). By changing the value of a ,  
redistribution of profits takes place faster (larger a )  or slower (smaller a).  
It is assumed that each type of capital is characterized by fixed technical coefficients, 
c and a (for capital coefficient and labour productivity, respectively). The capital coefficient 
is assumed to be fixed throughout the economy (and time), while labour productivity is 
assumed to change under the influence of technical progress. The profit rate of ij-capital is 
then given by (I-wla,)lc. 
The principal variable used to describe firm dynamics is the share of the labour force 
employed on each capital stock. Production is assumed to be always equal to production 
capacity (the influence of effective demand is absent), so that the amount of labour employed 
by each capital stock is equal to k,l(a,jc). Dividing this by the labour force (assumed to grow 
at a fixed rate P) gives the share of labour employed, v, (called the employment share 
hereafter). The expression for the growth rate of this variable is 
R&D also has an employment effect. We assume that the ratio between R&D expenditures 
and R&D labour input is equal to a fraction 6 of the economy-wide labour productivity. The 
employment rate vq resulting from production is then found by summing v, over i and j. 
Under these assumptions, it can then be shown that the overall employment rate v is equal 
to (1 +6y(l -w/a))vq. 
Eqs. (1) and (3) together create a selection mechanism in our artificial economy. Eq. 
(3) describes how more profitable (i.e., with above-average labour productivity) technologies 
tend to increase their employment share, whereas more backward (below-average) 
technologies tend to vanish. The real Phillips curve eq. (1) ensures that real wages tend to 
track labour productivity in the long run. In a situation in which new technologies are 
continually being introduced, this implies that all technologies, after an initial phase of market 
penetration and diffusion, will eventually vanish from the production system. 
The introduction of new technologies is modeled by a process of endogenous R&D. 
Firms devote resources (R&D) to the systematic search for new production possibilities (i.e., 
new types of capital). The outcome of this search process is assumed to be stochastic. Each 
time an innovation occurs, the firm creates a new type of capital. The labour productivity of 
this type of capital is given by the following process: 
where z is the fixed proportional increase in labour productivity between innovations and 
is the firm-specific best practice labour productivity. The new type of capital is seeded with 
a small employment share (say 0.0001). In order to keep the total employment rate constant, 
this seed value is (proportionally) removed from the other types of capital of the innovating 
firm. The number of technologies employed by any given firm may vary in time. 
As real wages rise over time, every technology will generate negative profits at some 
stage (because of its fixed labour productivity). It is assumed that these losses are financed 
by an equivalent decrease of the capital stock. In other words, losses imply that capital will 
be scrapped, and scrapped capital can be "consumed" to cover the losses. Note that for 
individual capital stocks, the point at which scrapping occurs lies prior to the point where 
profits are negative, due to the a-related diffusion term in eq. (2). When a technology's 
employment share falls below a specified (very small) value E, it is scrapped completely. 
A firm's R&D activities (measured by a variable hi, to be defined below) determine 
the firm's probability of making an innovation, according to a Poisson process with arrival 
rate pi. The simplest relation is simply linear: 
where p,,, is the (small) autonomous probability of making a fortuitous innovation without 
doing formal R&D, and A is the innovation function slope.15 
The firm-specific R&D level hi is defined to be the ratio of a moving average of firm 
R&D investment to its total physical capital stock. A ratio is used to normalize for firm size, 
since otherwise such a strong positive feedback between R&D and firm growth exists that 
monopoly becomes inevitable. While a priori it is by no means clear why the size of 
individual R&D effort should not directly relate to innovative success, a pure scale effect 
must be ruled out by the continuing existence of competition and the ability of small countries 
to remain or even advance in the technology race. The exponential moving average RD, on 
R&D for a lag of L (or a depreciation rate of 1IL) is given by the following differential 
equation: 
Hence the firm-specific R&D level is 
hi = RD,lk,. 
An innovation can be defined in a narrow or a wide sense. In the wide sense, the 
adoption of any technology not yet employed by a firm (or a country) is an innovation to that 
unit. In the narrow sense, only technologies that have never been employed before anywhere 
l 5  In Silverberg and Verspagen (1994a), experiments were carried out using a logistic form for this function 
instead of the linear one used here, and in which other f m s '  R&D enter the innovation probability function (i.e., 
there are R&D spillovers). 
are considered innovations at their time of introduction. If firms innovate according to the 
above Poisson arrival rates in the narrow sense, however, a very considerable intertemporal 
externality is created, because firms' innovations always build on each other. Thus there can 
be no duplication of effort and, as long as firms maintain a minimal level of R&D, no 
cumulative falling behind. 
On the other hand, once an innovation has been introduced somewhere, either in the 
domestic economy or elsewhere in the world, it should be progressively easier for other firms 
to imitate or duplicate it; it should not be necessary to reinvent the wheel. We capture this 
by introducing a catching-up effect. Let the labour productivity of the (world-wide) best 
practice technology be a*, and the best practice technology of firm i a*,. Then firm i's input 
in the innovation probability function (h;) will be augmented by a measure of its distance 
from the (world-wide) best practice frontier: 
Thus, adopting an old innovation is facilitated for backward firms (or countries as a 
whole), but they are still required to invest in their technological capacity to reap these 
catchup benefits. Here, however, R&D efforts should be interpreted in the larger sense of 
technological training and licensing, reverse engineering, or even industrial espionage (all 
costly activities, if not as costly as doing state-of-the-art R&D). 
This is the only way in which we allow for technology spillovers between countries. 
As already stressed above, this representation of spillovers is a very simple oneI6. We leave 
a more realistic model of catching up to a future paper, because we believe that, even given 
this simple context, some interesting conclusions are already suggested by the model. 
We have also experimented with innovations in the narrow sense, but the results on 
strategic selection are rather ambiguous. This is not surprising, since the import of the 
intertemporal externality is indeed quite large. We consider the Ansatz in eq. 8 therefore to 
be a justifiable first formulation, since technology adoption decisions are never passive, but 
rather require technological efforts of the adopting firm. However, it does place too much of 
the burden of catching up onto R&D. 
In the artificial economy modelled here, entry of a new firm occurs only as a result 
of exit of an incumbent firm. Exit occurs whenever a firm's employment share (excluding its 
R&D employment) falls below a fixed level E. While exit of incumbent firms is completely 
endogenous, entry only occurs in case of exit, so that the total number of f i s  is constant. 
Naturally, this feature of the model is not very realistic, as in reality entry may be 
independent of exit and the total population of firms may vary. However, it is not the aim of 
this model to describe the phenomena of entry and exit as such. Instead, the main function 
of entry and exit is to maintain potential variety in the population of firms while providing 
for firm elimination. 
Whenever entry occurs, the entrant is assigned a single technology with an amount of 
capital corresponding to an employment share of 2E (the remaining employment is 
- -- 
l6 We have experimented with one additional formulation, only a bit more realistic than the one offered here. 
In this case, a f m ' s  R&D potential was augmented by both a catch-up term relative to the world best-practice 
frontier, and a similar term for the domestic economy. By setting the values of the two parameters associated 
to this term, a situation could be created in which it is easier to catch up to the domestic frontier and harder to 
catch up globally. The results of this implementation are not different from the ones presented below, which 
adopt the simpler, global representation of catching up. 
proportionally removed from other firms so that total employment remains constant). The 
labour productivity of this technology is drawn uniformly from the range [(1-b)A,(l+b)A], 
where A is the unweighted mean value of labour productivity of all the firms in the economy, 
and b is a parameter. The values for h and y are (uniformly) drawn from the range existing 
in the economy at the time of entry. 
The final step in the construction of the model deals with the way in which firms 
change their R&D strategy parameters y. Learning enters the picture in the form of two 
"genetic" operators: mutation and imitation. These are summarized below: 
Prob 1 -n,-n;: yir =Y~,-~. 
With probability n each decision period, which is set exogenously and equal for all firms, 
a firm will draw from a normal distribution and alter its strategy within the admissible range 
[O, 11 (mutation). With variable probability mi the firm simply imitates the strategy of another 
firm. The imitation probability is partly endogenous to reflect satisficing behaviour. Only 
firms with unsatisfactory rates of profit with respect to economy leaders will choose or be 
forced (for example by their stockholders or by hostile takeovers) to adopt the strategy of a 
competitor: 
y, is the firm's rate of expansion of physical capital (defined as min(r,, (1-y,)r,)), y, and y,, 
are the maximum and minimum values of y in the country, and p is the (exogenously 
determined) maximum imitation probability. Thus, the more profitable a firm is relative to the 
other firms in its country, the less likely it will change its strategy by imitating another firm. 
The most profitable firm in the country has an imitation probability equal to zero; the least 
profitable the maximum probability p. 
Once a firm has decided to imitate, it randomly selects a firm to imitate. In principle, 
the probability of each firm being imitated is proportional to its market share (i.e., larger 
firms are more likely to be drawn as examples of successful behaviour). The possibility of 
imitating foreign firms is regulated by a parameter F, which lies between 0 and 1. In the draw 
for a 'partner' for imitation, the market share of each foreign (relative to the firm that is 
imitating) firm is multiplied by F. Thus, if F=l,  foreign firms are as likely 'partners' for 
imitation as domestic firms (ceteris paribus their market shares), whereas if F=O, imitation 
of foreign firms is ruled out. The parameter F introduces a second behavioral interaction 
between countries in addition to technological catching up, namely the possibility of cross- 
country behavioral and organizational learning. The mechanism specified here is admittedly 
very primitive, since it does not consider behavioral rigidities or the costs associated with 
such learning. As we shall see in the following section, its effects on global behaviour are not 
particularly realistic, but it does show the way toward future extensions of the model. 
4. Simulation analysis 
We use simulation techniques to explore the outcomes of the model specified above. The set 
of differential equations is solved using a fixed-step, fourth-order Runge-Kutta algorithm. The 
innovation decisions are executed during each computational step (using Poisson arrival rates 
scaled by the computation time step), and when an innovation is made, the corresponding 
changes in initial conditions, number of equations, and coefficients are made for the next step. 
Mutation and imitation of strategies are only performed at fixed intervals of one "year", which 
may be many times the step employed in the Runge-Kutta algorithm. In the following 
simulations the number of countries is set to five and the number of firms to ten in each 
country." 
In previous work outlining the outcomes of a single-country version of the model, two 
main features were identified. First, it turns out that under quite general parameter settings, 
the model leads to a long-term evolutionary steady state in which firms converge to similar 
R&D strategies. The country-wide expost value of the ratio of R&D to investment converges 
to a stable value, which is only subject to small random variations due to continual 'mutant 
firms', which are not successful in breaking away from the evolutionary stable state. Only 
when the innovation slope parameter A is set to a relatively low value (indicating low 
technological opportunities) does this evolutionary steady state break down. 
Second, it was found that the model, when initialized with no R&D being undertaken 
by any firm, generates stages of development. The market structure (degree of concentration) 
plays a major role in these stages. Three stages can be differentiated. In the first stage, the 
market is strongly concentrated, and technical change is low. The intermediate stage implies 
a market that is slowly getting more competitive, and technical change goes up slightly. The 
final stage, i.e., the evolutionary steady state described above, is characterized by rapid 
technical change and a competitive market. These three 'regimes' are separated by sudden 
'jumps' between the broad levels of the concentration and R&D variables. 
At the individual country level, these outcomes extend to the multicountry case of this 
paper. We choose not to go into the question of stages of development here, however, but 
rather concentrate on the implications of the model in the evolutionary stable state, and 
investigate the properties of convergence indicators under these conditions. In order to do so, 
the model is initialized in a random state, where parameters are fixed to the values described 
in the appendix, and firm R&D strategies are drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 
and 1. All simulation experiments extend over a period of 5000 'years'. In virtually all cases, 
the model converges to its evolutionary steady state within the first 1000 periods, so that we 
concentrate on presenting and analyzing the outcomes of the last 4000 years. 
The first figure describing the outcomes of the model, Figure 4, summarizes the 
outcomes for the aggregate R&D to investment ratios at the country level, as well as the 
evolution of the coefficient of variation of labour productivity between the five countries. The 
diagrams in Figure 4 can be interpreted as follows. On the horizontal axis, the value of the 
parameter F is depicted, and on the vertical axis, there are bins for the observed values of 
economy-wide ex-post R&D to investment ratios, and the coefficient of variation. The shades 
between black and white in the diagram indicate peaks (black) or valleys (white) in the (3D) 
histograms arising from the simulation experiments. Thus, a black area in the diagram 
l7 The results readily extend to other values for the number of countries or firms. Even in the 2-country case, 
the main results are preserved. 
indicates that a high frequency for the corresponding value on the vertical axis in the 
experiments with the value of F found on the horizontal axis. The figures are based upon the 
last 1000 of 5000 'year' runs for five pooled runs with the same parameter values, but 
different random seeds. In the case of the R&D diagram, there are five observations 
(countries) per year. 
The narrow black band in the upper diagram of Figure 4 indicates the evolutionary 
stable state of R&D behaviour of firms. All firms in all countries are converging to the same 
R&D level. Only for zero values of the F parameter, lower R&D ratios, relative to the black 
band, are present. In this case, firms cannot imitate foreign firms' R&D strategies, and thus 
in some countries, firms will not converge to the steady state. Due to the knowledge 
spillovers between countries (according to equation 8), however, these countries still show 
technical progress. 
The case in which F=O is also quite extraordinary with respect to the coefficient of 
variation of labour productivities. This variable does not show clear convergence to any 
particular value, due to the differences in R&D levels between countries that might arise. For 
F>O, the coefficient of variation converges to a band close to, although not equal to, zero. 
Given these patterns in R&D and convergence, attention will be focused on the time 
series for convergence variables. From the many simulations carried out, two runs are selected 
in Figure 5. The top diagram in the figure gives the time series for the coefficient of variation 
and the log distance of country 2's productivity to the frontier, for the last 1000 'years' of 
a total of 5000, with F set to zero. The bottom diagram sets F to a positive value of 0.01, and 
depicts the same time series for the same variables 
Although the time series for the two cases seem to differ somewhat in their nature and 
significantly in the amplitude of the fluctuations, neither of them displays a clear pattern in 
the sense of convergence to a unique long run equilibrium value. In both cases, long-run 
cyclical variations with a rather imprecise periodic nature seem to be present. Given the 
interpretation of the 'periods' in the model as 'years"', it is easily imaginable that these 
long-run variations, if studied within a limited 'window of observation', could be interpreted 
as trends, pointing to structural changes in the underlying economic process. 
This interpretation, however, would be an incorrect one. The long run variations and 
apparent trend reversals were generated by the general, nonlinear structure of the model, 
which has remained constant over the whole simulation period. This impression of the time 
series generated by the model therefore leads us to put forward the hypothesis that the actual 
historical time series of convergence over the last one and a half century might be explained 
by general 'laws' underlying capitalist development, without having to invoke the uniqueness 
of one or the other period in history19. 
This hypothesis, however, is quite difficult to test, and we can therefore only explore 
the consequences of the model presented here a bit more, and leave further discussion of the 
idea to future research. Our strategy will therefore be to explore the time series in the above 
figures by means of spectral analysis, and compare the outcomes to the power spectra 
obtained in section 2. This will provide additional insight into the empirical relevance of our 
hypothesis. 
l8  The value of the capital-output ratio sets the time scale, while the ex post productivity growth rate can be 
adjusted to realistic values for these time units. 
l9 This is not to say that we do not support the idea that there are general features of the postwar period that 
contributed to the observed patterns of economic growth. 
In Figure 6 we have plotted the power spectrum of the coefficients of variation series 
shown in Figure 5 (note that the dataset now consists of 4000 rather than 1000 'years'). Both 
cases, although markedly different for the higher frequency spectral densities, clearly show 
a llf noise pattern, corresponding to the empirical data presented in section 2. Obviously, 
there are differences between the empirical data and the simulation data, for example with 
regard to the actual slope of the lines. The case that the model makes should therefore not 
be overstated, but still the marked llf noise pattern in both simulation and actual data is 
striking. 
Figure 7 presents the power spectra for the other, individual country measures for 
convergence used in section 2. Again, the underlying data are the same as in Figure 5, but 
with 4000 'years' used for the spectral analysis. As in Figure 6, the power spectra show a 
clear llfnoise pattern, again supporting the interpretation the model provides about catching 
up or falling behind. 
5. Conclusions 
We have extended an evolutionary model of endogenous growth to the case of convergence 
between countries' productivity levels. The model makes very rudimentary assumptions in 
order to explore the boundaries of explanatory power of the broad class of formal 
evolutionary approaches to the topic of economic growth. Despite its simple nature, the model 
generates time series for convergence indicators that bear similarities to actual empirical time 
series for the core OECD countries over the last 120 years. 
Based upon a comparison of the power spectra of the simulated and actual time series, 
we put forward an explanation of convergence based upon the idea that long-term variations 
in relative productivity levels are caused by the underlying general nature of the economic 
process, rather than specific structural breaks in, for example, institutional contexts. The latter 
hypothesis, in the form that the postwar period provided unusual circumstances facilitating 
rapid catching up by lagging countries, is one of the central themes of the recent literature 
on convergence. 
We have admittedly dealt with social and organizational change in a very primitive 
way (i.e., by allowing for cross-country imitation mediated by the parameter F). If such 
imitation is introduced, long-term disparities in growth patterns nearly vanish. This is not 
surprising, given that behavioral imitation is modelled as possibly costless and instantaneous. 
We interpret this as indicating that country-specific rigidities, the delays and costs involved 
in accumulating the necessary human capital, and related factors do indeed need to be invoked 
to explain heterogeneous growth patterns and catching up (or falling behind) dynamics if a 
significant amount of behavioral imitation is admitted. 
The model emphasizes the stochastic character of the innovation process, which leads 
to an uneven spread of innovations over time. Given the mechanism specified for diffusion 
of innovations, this uneven stream of innovation generates an uneven growth path for 
individual economies over time. When multiple economies are linked to each other by a 
simple catch-up mechanism, this leads to a rather typical pattern of convergence over the long 
run. In terms of spectral analysis, this pattern corresponds to the presence of llf noise. 
llfnoise is characterized by increasing importance of lower frequencies in explaining 
the overall motion of a times series. When the log of the frequency is plotted against the log 
of the spectral density, a linear, downward sloping curve emerges. This indicates that 
frequency components in the time series become more important as the frequency declines 
(i.e, fluctuations take place at all time scales). Following the interpretation of Silverberg and 
Lehnert (1993), who found the same property for individual countries, using a similar, but 
simpler model than ours, we interpret this as a long wave theory of convergence in the world 
economy. When confronted with these very long-term components of the underlying dynamics 
it is natural to be inclined to interpret short intervals of data as characterized by significant 
trends or structural breaks specific to the historical epoch observed. The alternative we have 
outlined here is to regard such phenomena as intrinsic components of a larger fundamental 
mechanism. 
Although we do not want to stretch the similarities between our model and the actual 
data too far, we still think that the striking similarity between the empirical stylized facts and 
the stylized facts of our model are close enough to warrant further empirical and formal work 
examining our hypothesis about the general nature of observed convergence patterns. 
Appendix - Parameter values used in the simulation 
Number of Firms = 10 
Number of countries = 5 
L = 5  
c = 3  
a = l  
p = 0.01 
m = 0.9 
n = l  
2 = 0.02 
y endogenous, initialized randomly from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1 
p = 0.01 
A = 10 
7C = 0.02 
s = 0.02 
p = 0.02 
6 = 1  
E = 0.005 
b = 0.1 
~ = 4  
F = 0 through 0.05 
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Figure 5. Time series of selected convergence variables in two runs, with &O (top 
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